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Prosecuting Heads of State:
Evolving Questions of Venue -
Where, How, and Why?
By MASAYA UCHINO*
I. Introduction
Even as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century,
long-entrenched dictatorships continue to victimize their citizens with
iron-fisted rule in many regions of the world, committing countless
human rights violations with impunity on a daily basis.' As a result,
millions have been killed and even more have been forcibly displaced
from their home under fearful and devastating conditions. However,
the political climate of the post-Cold War world has allowed for a
greater number of these authoritarian regimes to transition to more
democratic, elected civilian governments.3 In February 2011, for
example, almost a dozen countries in the Middle East and North
Africa exploded with civil unrest as rebel groups and civilians took to
the streets in an attempt to oust their respective dictators. In Egypt,
* University of California, Hastings College of Law, Class of 2011. The author has
worked as a Research Associate at the Genocide Intervention Network and interned
for Physicians for Human Rights. The author dedicates this article to his family and
friends and would especially like to thank his mentor and advisor, Professor Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, for her wisdom and guidance.
1. See, e.g., HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESEARCH,
CONFLICT BAROMETER 2009 (2009), available at http://www.hiik.de/en/konflikt
barometer/pdflConflictBarometer_2009.pdf.
2. In the recent conflict, in the Darfur region of Sudan alone, tens of thousands
of civilians were killed and 2.2 million people were displaced between April 2003 and
mid-2004. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR 2007: CHAOS BY DESIGN 27, 35 (2007),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0907 web.pdf.
3. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 1,
5 (2002), available at http://www.journalofdemocracy.orglarticles/gratis/Carothers-13-
1.pdf.
4. Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa - Country by Country,
CNN.COM, Feb. 22, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/21/mideast.
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for example, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11,
2011, as a result of massive nation-wide protests.! The new military
and civilian leadership has already signaled a commitment to civilian
rule.' Meanwhile, other countries, such as Libya, lie in a state of
violent chaos and even civil war, as rebel groups and civilians try to
oust their heads of state, attempting to follow in the footsteps of
Egypt.
As these changes occur and democratic civilian leaderships have
the potential to emerge, the new governments, citizens, and the
international community grapple with a multitude of issues
concerning how to most appropriately affect transitions, allowing
these countries to move forward. One of the most controversial and
difficult issues will be determining how to hold the ousted heads of
state accountable for any illegal acts they committed during their rule.
Over the past few decades, international criminal law has evolved to
the point where it is now possible to impose accountability upon
perpetrators of international crimes in an international court. Ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and other types of special courts have
been created to prosecute former heads of state who have violated
international law by committing genocide, crimes against humanity,
or war crimes. Additionally, states have begun to adhere to the
principle of universal jurisdiction under which states can claim
jurisdiction over perpetrators who have committed international
crimes outside their boundaries.'
africa.unrest/?hpt=T2.
5. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/
12egypt.html.
6. Sharon Otterman, Egypt's Leaders Signal Commitment to Civilian Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/Africal
22egypt.html?scp=4&sq=egypt&st=cse.
7. Kareem Fahim, Rebels Hope for Qaddafi's Fall but Remain Fearful, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/africa/24rebels.htmI
?hp.
8. For example, after Belgium enacted its universal jurisdiction law in 1993,
victim complaints flooded in against former dictators and sitting heads of state
including: Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Ivory Coast President Laurent
Gbagbo, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Cuban President Fidel Castro, Central
African Republic Ange-Felix Patasse, Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou
Nguesso, Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat, former Chadian President
Hissene Habre, former Chilean President General Augusto Pinochet, and former
Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger,
Introduction to PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 3 (Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger,
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Given this evolution in international law, deciding where to
prosecute a former or current' head of state has become a
controversial and complex issue. At first glance, the creation of
specialized international courts tailored to specific conflicts seemed to
have the potential to solve this problem.10 However, the United
Nations then decided to further develop the arena of international
prosecution by authorizing the creation of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), a single court which has jurisdiction over all conflict that
might otherwise have been parceled out to conflict-specific tribunals.
The treaty establishing the ICC has now been ratified by one hundred
and eleven states (conspicuously, not including the United States)."
Notably, the ICC has embedded within its statute what has become
known as the "principle of complimentarily."12 This principle gives
the ICC jurisdiction over cases where states are unwilling or unable to
investigate and prosecute violations of international law."
However, despite the creation of these international courts,
prosecutions of heads of state in national courts still occur. For
example, former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori was convicted
by the Supreme Court of Peru for aggravated homicide, assault, and
kidnapping in April 2009. Fujimori was sentenced to twenty-five
years in prison and ordered to issue reparations to the victims of his
crimes."
Various distinctions between international and national
prosecutions can significantly impact the public impact and ultimate
eds., 2009).
9. For example, the International Criminal Court indicted current Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir in April 2009. Press Release, International Criminal
Court, ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan, U.N.
Press Release ICC/394, (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and
%20medialpress%20releases/press%20releases%20(2009)/icc%20issues%20a%20wa
rrant%20of%20arrest%20for%200mar%20al%20bashir %20president%200f%20su
dan.
10. See Mary Margaret Penrose, It's Good to be the King: Prosecuting Heads of
State and Former Heads of State under International Law, 39 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 193,218-20 (2000).
11. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/2/Res.3,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter, ICC Statute].
12. See id. art. 17.
13. See generally JANN J. KLEFFNER, COMPLIMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE
AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (2008).
14. Jo-Marie Burt, Guilty as Charged: The Tial of Former Peruvian President
Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 3 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 384,
396 - 97 (2009).
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outcome of a case. This note addresses some of the issues that can
arise within this comparison by contrasting the successes of the
Fujimori case, which occurred in a Peruvian court, with other cases
that have and are being held in international tribunals. Part I
examines the different types of venues that currently exist where a
head of state can be prosecuted. Part II looks at two basic factors that
distinguish the different types of venues: chargeable crimes and
applicable theories of criminal liability. Finally, Part III examines
how these factors played out and are currently playing out in three
very different examples - the prosecutions of (1) Alberto Fujimori,
(2) Slobodan Milosevic, and (3) Charles Taylor. This note will
demonstrate that certain fundamental factors that distinguish
prosecutions in national and international courts can significantly
affect both the outcome of the trials of heads of state and the impact
of these trials upon the victims. These factors will also increasingly
influence the prosecutorial choices of those states that may transition
out of authoritarian regimes.
II. The Different Venues Available for Prosecuting Heads of
State in the Twenty-First Century
Through the ratification of various international covenants, the
international community has generally recognized that a legal
obligation, known as aut dedere autjudicare, exists to prosecute or
extradite individuals who have committed certain international
crimes." This duty to prosecute is also recognized within customary
international law and it has been cited numerous times by the United
Nations and courts throughout the world." It has been regarded as
15. This duty to extradite or prosecute can be found in approximately seventy
international criminal law conventions. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE
SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY MATTERS FOR PEACE 11 n.21 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij07O9webwcover_3.pdf. Some notable
conventions specifying such a duty include: the Genocide Convention, the
Convention Against Torture, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2562 - 2582 (1991); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND
EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY To EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995).
16. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 12-14; Orentlicher, supra note 15,
at 2581-95. The application of this duty to prosecute has also been embedded in the
Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - that all member
States have "the duty to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
[Vol. 34:2344
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one of the principle means for the world to combat impunity and
bring about justice for victims of state-authorized violence and
terror." The importance of this process has been reinforced by
research conducted by Human Rights Watch that suggests that the
failure to hold individuals accountable for mass atrocities can
contribute to a resurgence of violence and conflict."
Between January 1990 and today, more than sixty-seven heads of
state and governments from forty-three countries have been formally
charged or indicted with serious criminal offenses in ninety-nine
separate indictments in various domestic and international courts.19
Of those ninety-nine indictments, roughly half proceeded to trial,
thirty-five were convicted, and about seventeen served some sort of a
sentence.20  Each indictment, trial, conviction, or sentence was
conducted or ordered under very different circumstances. One of the
most fundamental factors that distinguish these prosecutions is where
they occurred. This Part examines the three types of venues in which
these sixty-seven heads of state were prosecuted.
A. Domestic Courts
According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
"[a]s a matter of principle, it should remain the rule that national
courts have jurisdiction [over human rights violations], because any
lasting solution must come from the nation itself."21 With the
exception of those prosecuted in post-World War II tribunals,22 heads
international crimes." ICC Statute, supra note 11, at pmbl.
17. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities? 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 27-31 (2001) (arguing that
accountability that is brought by international tribunals can be regarded as a
reflection of a new "realism").
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 76 - 77; see also Mary Robinson,
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275, 277 -
78 (1999); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, Vindication of Justiciable Victims'Rights to Truth
and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1488 - 97
(2002) (demonstrating how impunity in Guatemala contributed to further violence).
19. Lutz & Reiger, supra note 8, at 14 - 15.
20. Id.
21. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 49th Sess.,
Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and
political): Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission
Decision 1996/119, 1 28 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997).
22. Post-World War II tribunals include the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal to
hold individuals responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity that occurred
2011] 345
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of state have traditionally been prosecuted within their own domestic
courts until recently. However, even after states began to sign on to a
number of treaties that embodied the principle of aut dedere aut
judicare, not many heads of state were prosecuted during the Cold
War, even in domestic courts, again with the notable exception of
trials related to the atrocities committed during the Second World
War." Once the Cold War ended, the world witnessed a surge in both
the willingness and the capacity of domestic courts to prosecute
former heads of state. Some notable examples include24 the
convictions of several military junta members in Argentina,25 the
conviction of the former president of Ethiopia Mengistu Haile
Mariam for genocide by an Ethiopian court in 2006,26 and the
conviction of former president of Iraq Saddam Hussein by the Iraqi
High Tribunal in 2006 for crimes against humanity.27
A state holding its own former leader accountable for egregious
violations of human rights has its advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages include (1) easier access to witnesses, evidence, victims,
and perpetrators; (2) the creation of a deep connection between the
people of the country and the impact of the trial; (3) empowerment of
victims of the atrocities; and (4) sometimes, that domestic prosecution
during the war. STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 210-12
(3rd ed. 2009).
23. The few cases that did arise during the Cold War include: Greece
(prosecutions of members of the military junta following its demise in 1974);
Equatorial Guinea (trial and execution of Francisco Macias Nguema for genocide
and other crimes in 1979) and Vietnam (conviction of Pol Pot and leng Sary in
absentia for genocide in 1979). However, these trials were highly politicized in
nature and lacked the fundamental elements of due process. Id. at 185.
24. For a complete list, see Lutz & Reiger, supra note 8, app.
25. In 1987, Raul Alfonsin and his successor, Carlos Menem, pardoned those that
were convicted due to pressure from the military. However, in 2003, President
N6stor Kirchner convinced Congress in 2003 to nullify the amnesty laws, which was
held a constitutional act by the Supreme Court in 2005 by a vote of 7-1. As a result,
prosecutions of hundreds of military and police who ordered or carried out atrocities
resumed. RATNER ET AL., supra note 22, at 189.
26. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Ethiopia's Ex-Dictator Convicted of Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/world/africa/12cnd-africa
.html?scp=1&sq=ethiopia's%20ex%20dictator%20convicted%200f%20genocide&st
=cse.
27. See Kirk Semple, Saddam Hussein is Sentenced to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/world/middleeast/05cnd-saddam.html?
scp=1&sq=saddam%20hussein%20is%20sentenced%20to%20death&st=cse.
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can be relatively inexpensive compared to international tribunals.'
These advantages are only realized, however, when the domestic
judicial systems have the capacity to put on fair and effective trials of
perpetrators with national prestige. Local courts can be dangerous as
they are more likely to be biased or politically motivated than
international courts.29  Additionally, domestic judicial systems may
not be developed enough to handle a case of such magnitude.
Scholars have identified four fundamental conditions crucial for the
establishment a fair and effective judiciary: (1) a workable legal
framework of well-crafted criminal law and procedure statutes; (2) a
trained cadre of judges, prosecutors, defenders, and investigators; (3)
adequate infrastructure, such as courtroom facilities, investigative
offices, record-keeping capabilities, and detention and prison
facilities; and (4) a culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality
of the process and the rights of the accused. Given how many
countries of the world remain far from achieving these standards,
domestic trials of political figures often can become tainted by bias,
politics, or administrative inefficiencies.
In addition to the functional challenges of prosecuting a head of
state effectively, a greater challenge for a state to hold their former
leader accountable can be a lack of the political will to do so. States
can simply refuse to prosecute a head of state because of their
national interest in protecting their international reputation. A highly
publicized trial would alert the world to the most gruesome evidence
of a state's egregious acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, those who may have ties to such acts (perpetrators or
victims) may react in extreme and even violent ways." These
challenges often lead states to create amnesty laws or to pursue non-
prosecutorial alternatives, such as truth commissions, in an effort to
28. RATNER ET AL., supra note 22, at 203 - 04; see also Antonio Cassesse, The
Role of International Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International
Criminality, in CESARE, R. ROMANO ET AL., INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS:
SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO AND CAMBODIA 4 (2004).
29. William W. Burke-White, Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (2002).
30. RATNER ET AL., supra note 22, at 204. These authors also cite to a list of
minimum standards of justice in international law that has been codified in a UN
General Assembly resolution, G.A. Res. 48/137, pmbl. 1 5, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Vol. I), at 256 (Dec. 20, 1993).
31. See generally Michael Pulos, 'Hiding Corpses' within Sovereign Borders:
Why the World Fails to Prosecute Genocide, 11 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
161 (2006); Aldana-Pindell, supra note 18, at 1402 - 08.
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hold heads of state accountable.
In addition to being prosecuted in the courts of their own
countries, heads of state may also be prosecuted in a court outside the
state where the atrocities were committed. The courts of these host
countries where the heads of state reside can exercise jurisdiction
based on either the nationality of the head of state or on universal
jurisdiction in cases where the head of state has committed
internationally condemned crimes, such as genocide or crimes against
humanity.3 2 Some states, such as Spain and Belgium, have enacted
domestic legislation that allows for universal jurisdiction that goes
beyond any treaty obligations." For example, Spain's highest court
upheld Spanish jurisdiction to investigate and try acts of genocide in
Chile, Argentina, and more recently, in Guatemala.34 Belgium also
recognized universal jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting former
Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet for crimes against humanity,
based on international customary law. 5 Some argue that, as such
precedent develops, we will see a growth in the reach of national
courts over international crimes committed outside their respective
territories, as these courts extend their jurisdiction to cover many
36
cases that international courts are unwilling to take on.
B. The Rise of International Courts
In the early 1990s, international responses (or the lack thereof)
to two catastrophic events triggered the emergence of the existing ad
hoc international criminal tribunals. The first instance surfaced due
to the failures of the U.S. and European intervention in the explosive
conflict that plagued the Balkans in the early 1990s.37 The
international community began to realize that the impact of any
intervention efforts by the U.S. or NATO forces was extremely
32. See STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 -12 (2004).
33. See CODE PENAL [C.PtN.] art. 135 (Belg.); C.P., B.O.E. n.607-14, Nov. 23,
1995 (Spain).
34. NAOMI RoHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECr 139 - 49 (2005). For recent
developments on this issue that arose with the Guatemala Genocide case, see Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 207 (1996).
35. ROHT-ARRIAZA,THE PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 34, at 118 - 21.
36. See Louise Arbour, Will the ICCHave an Impact on Universal Jurisdiction?,
1 J. INT'L. CRIM.JUST. 585 (2003).
37. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 481 - 84 (2002).
348 [Vol. 34:2
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limited." The U.S. eventually called for a war crimes tribunal to be
created for the former Yugoslavia.39 As a result, in 1993, the United
Nations Security Council (Security Council) established the Ad Hoc
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY). 0  In
establishing the ICTY, the Security Council asserted that judicial
accountability for perpetrators was a prerequisite for ensuring that
41peace and protection of human rights are guaranteed in the future.
The ICTY became the first international court to indict a sitting head
of state, Slobodan Milosevic, for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.42
While the ICTY was being created, the international community
was once again failing to respond effectively to a crisis of
unprecedented magnitude - the world lay silent as genocide raged in
Rwanda in 1994, resulting in the deaths of 800,000 in 100 days. 43 The
Security Council approved the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) - a court similar to the ICTY - to
prosecute genocide and other systematic, widespread violations of
international humanitarian law in Rwanda.' The ICTR broke new
ground when it convicted a former head of state, Jean Kambanda,45
who pled guilty to charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
related crimes.46
38. Id. at 269 - 327 (Bosnia), 406 - 43 (Srebrenica).
39. Id. at 481-84.
40. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 29, 1993).
41. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 1 25-26, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993).
42. See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, President Milosevic and Four other Senior Fry [sic] Officials Indicted for
Murder, Persecution, and Deportation in Kosovo (May 29, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7765 [hereinafter Press Release, ICTY].
43. See POWER, supra note 37, at 354 - 89.
44. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
45. Kambanda was the prime minister of Rwanda during the period in which the
genocide occurred. Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of
Human Rights Leagues Applaud International Tribunal Arrests, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 22, 1997), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1997/07/22/human-rights-watch-
and-international-federation-human-rights-leagues-applaud-interna.
46. See Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and
Sentence, 3 (Sept. 4, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/
Kambandaldecisions/kambanda.pdf.
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These two tribunals became fuel for controversial international
efforts towards creating the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Among the litany of arguments advanced for and against the creation
of the ICC, one notable pro-ICC argument to highlight is the
"tribunal fatigue" argument. Proponents of this argument have
emphasized how the expensive, time-consuming nature of ad hoc
tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR drain the resources of the
U.N. and the international community and subsequently, they fear
the continuous emergence of future ad hoc tribunals as crises
47
emerge.
After much debate over political and legal issues, sixty countries,
excluding the U.S., ratified the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which entered into force on July 1, 2002.48 Five
"situations" have been referred to the ICC (either by the home
country or by the United Nations): Uganda, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the Central African Republic, the Darfur region of
Sudan, and most recently Kenya.49 A number of high-level officials
have been indicted in each case and arrest warrants have been issued.
Notably, on March 4, 2009, the ICC indicted Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir, a sitting head of state, for crimes against humanity
and war crimes and, possibly, genocide."o
C. The Emergence of Hybrid Courts
In addition to these international tribunals, over the objection of
those who supported the "tribunal fatigue" argument, the Security
Council authorized a number of new tribunals, known as "hybrid
courts."" Hybrid courts are authorized for situations where national
judicial systems have been virtually destroyed by conflict and the
47. See Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal
Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167, 169-70 (1995); Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of
AdHoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543-44 (2004).
48. About the Court, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
49. Situations and cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
50. Press Release, International Criminal Court, supra note 9.
51. For arguments of proponents of hybrid courts, see, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson,
The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003); Alain Pellet,
Internationalized Courts: Better than Nothing, in ROMANO ET AL., supra note 28.
For arguments of critics of hybrid courts, see, e.g., Luigi Condorellii & Thdo
Boutruche, Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Are They Necessary?,
in ROMANO ET AL., supra note 28.
[Vol. 34:2350
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country lacked qualified lawyers and unbiased judges.52 These hybrid
courts were established to prosecute those responsible for serious
crimes in the territory of the court, to provide for mixed benches of
international and local prosecutors, and to have jurisdiction over
various international crimes and, in some cases, crimes under
domestic law." Yet, each court has its distinct characteristics, which
often depend on the extent to which international law, as opposed to
the host country's domestic law, is emphasized in the court's founding
charter. An example of a hybrid court is the Special Court of Sierra
Leone (SCSL), which was created on August 14, 2000.54 It is
important to note that, as a hybrid court, the creation of the SCSL
was triggered by the request of the home country itself, rather than
being imposed upon Sierra Leone by the U.N. or other states."
Additionally, unlike the ICTY or ICTR that have primacy over
national courts, Sierra Leone has concurrent jurisdiction." Thus, by
incorporating national law into its jurisdiction, courts like the SCSL
have the ability to address a variety of crimes that international
criminal tribunals cannot.
A notable highlight of the SCSL, discussed in greater detail in
Part III, is the ongoing trial of former Liberian president Charles
Taylor, who was indicted in 2003." After his indictment, officials at
the SCSL expressed concern that Taylor's appearance in court could
52. The most extreme example is East Timor, which had fewer than ten lawyers
in country in the wake of the 1999 violence. RATNER ET AL., supra note 22, at 246
n.215.
53. 1d. at 247.
54. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). Other hybrid courts
have been established in Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Dickinson,
supra note 51, at 295.
55. J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 37, 80 (2006).
56. When exercising their primacy over national courts, adhoc tribunals have the
power to intervene "at any stage of the procedure ... [the Tribunal] can formally
request national courts to defer to [its] competence." See Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 8(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(deciding to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal); see also Updated
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
1877, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY statute]; YUSUF
AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM THE AD Hoc
TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 51-52 (2004).
57. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-I, Indictment
(Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Indictments/SCSL-03-01-PT%
20Taylor%20Indictment.pdf [hereinafter, Taylor Indictment].
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prompt a rescue attempt or even renewed fighting in Sierra Leone."
Other officials objected, arguing that the SCSL had successfully
prosecuted other officials who posed similar security concerns, and
that moving the trial away from Sierra Leone would make the
proceedings less accessible to the victims of Taylor's actions and the
general population of Sierra Leone." However, despite these
objections, Taylor was moved to a courtroom in the ICC in 2006,
though the proceedings are still being handled under the purview of
the SCSL."
Taylor's case highlights the complex considerations that go into
determining the best venue to prosecute a head of state. Especially as
the ICC begins to take on more cases and develop precedent,
determining where to prosecute a head of state will become
increasingly difficult. Therefore, it is important to have a good
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages that result from
the distinct features of each type of venue.
III. Two Distinguishing Characteristics Among Venues:
Chargeable Crimes and Theories of Liability
Courts in every country have their own respective codes and
procedures to follow. As we will find in this Part, codes and
procedures also significantly vary between domestic and international
courts. For prosecutors, the available codes and procedures of a
court become the tools for charging a case. For example, the
conscription of child soldiers may be a crime in the jurisdiction of
Country X and international court A, but may not be listed as a
chargeable crime in the penal code of Country Y or the charter of
international court B. Thus, as a prosecutor seeking to hold a former
head of state of Country Y accountable for its conscription of child
soldiers, the venue of the trial will make all the difference in the
outcome. We will find in this Part that, first, unlike domestic courts
which typically have a wide array of chargeable crimes, international
courts only have limited jurisdiction over only a few egregious crimes
(e.g., genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
58. Abdul Tejan-Cole, A Big Man in a Small Cell, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF
STATES, supra note 8, at 219.
59. Id. at 221.
60. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court President
Requests Charles Taylor Be Tried in the Hague (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gR%2bYCtzTfKg%3d&tabid=111.
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Further, international courts have specifically enumerated forms
of criminal liability that prosecutors must apply to hold defendants
accountable for these limited crimes. Although a number of other
factors in different systems of criminal procedure can also greatly
affect trials, this note focuses on the two basic distinctions between
domestic courts and the varying international courts mentioned
above.
A. Chargeable Crimes
1. Domestic Courts
Regardless of the emergence of various international tribunals,
domestic courts still remain the primary forum for the prosecution of
international crimes. The types of crimes that prosecutors can use in
national courts vary with the national penal code of the state at issue.
At least three models can be identified." First, states can prosecute
crimes that already exist in their penal codes, such as murder and
assault.62 However, penal codes of some states do not necessarily
have the means for prosecutors to charge a defendant with, for
example, the systematic killings of specific population.
Realizing this limitation, some states have broadened the types
of chargeable crimes by defining and proscribing what are
traditionally international crimes in their national criminal law. For
example, at least eighty-six countries have incorporated laws against
genocide into their domestic codes. 3 Some states simply copy
definitions and proscriptions used by international tribunals, whereas
others incorporate them with modifications." These modifications
may not always be consistent with prevailing customary or treaty-
based international law.6 ' Therefore, this second model does not
necessarily mean that a domestic court will adopt the procedures and
standards of international law.
A third model exists in which some states have decided to
directly incorporate international crimes into their penal codes by
61. WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 89 (2006).
62. Id. at 19.
63. The Crime of Genocide in Domestic Law and Penal Codes, PREVENT
GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2011).
64. FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 19.
6 5. Id.
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reference." Under this model, prosecutors can directly apply
international criminal law, which expands prosecutorial
opportunities." However, it is important to mention that this does
not necessarily mean that the perpetrators will face the same results
and consequences by being charged under the international definition
of the crime. For example, in Pius Nwaoga v State, a Nigerian
lieutenant was convicted of murder and the Nigerian Supreme Court
stated that the killing amounted to a crime against humanity.6 Also,
in the cases involving the Haitian Raboteau massacre, the Nigerian
Supreme Court mentioned that the criminal actions amounted to
crimes against humanity, yet members of the Haitian army were
convicted for ordinary domestic crimes.6 As in these examples,
oftentimes, a judge may state that the acts were tantamount to an
international crime, without imposing any practical consequences
beyond those which may be ordered following a conviction for an
ordinary murder.'
Although the option to apply international law exists, national
courts rarely end up using international criminal law in prosecutions."
This is the case for at least four reasons. First, as mentioned before,
states can already be hesitant to prosecute heads of state in general
for political reasons.72 Similarly, states may fear that applying
international criminal law to implicate former leaders for crimes as
severe as genocide may tarnish their reputations and incite the
former/current supporters of the perpetrator to trigger more
violence."
Second, national authorities find their own law more
66. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 351 (2000).
67. The success of these arguments depends on how international criminal law
fits within the constitutional scheme between international and national law of the
country. See generallyFERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 36 - 84.
68. Pius Nwaoga v. State [1972] 52 ILR 494, citedin FERDINANDUSSE, supra note
61, at 21.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. "[Tjhere has been a remarkably modest corpus of national case law
emanating from the jurisdictional possibilities provided in the Geneva Conventions
or in Additional Protocol I." Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 72 1 32 (Feb. 14, 2002) quoted in FERDINANDUSSE, supra note
61, at 91.
72. FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 92.
73. Leila Nadya Sadat, National Amnesties and Truth Commissions, in MACEDO,
supra note 32, at 194 - 201.
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"manageable" than international criminal law.74 The prosecution of
international crimes generally requires considerable cost and time,
more so than the prosecution of domestic crimes.7 ' Additionally,
expertise is required for national courts to work with international
crimes because, unlike with domestic crimes, often there is no clear
precedent on which courts may rely.76 For example, as compared to
establishing the mens rea for murder, it is generally much more
difficult to establish genocidal intent, the existence of an armed
conflict for war crimes, or the context necessary for crimes against
humanity.
Third, international crimes tend to have confusing definitions
that can be interpreted in multiple ways. As a result, case law has
diverged among various international courts on issues like what
actions constitute "rape," the existence of a hierarchy of international
crimes, and the question of whether the mens rea of murder as a
crime against humanity requires premeditation." Thus, when
domestic courts incorporate these crimes, they will end up having to
interpret what these definitions mean, defeating the purpose of direct
incorporation. Courts often do not have the constitutional
capabilities and judicial resources to deal with complex issues that
even international tribunals have difficulty settling definitively.
Fourth, domestic courts also hesitate to apply international law
because states' international obligations can sometimes collide with
national principles of prosecution. One example that has generated
much commentary in this context is the principle of retrospectivity,
which prohibits imposing new legal consequences for a crime that
74. FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 105.
75. The ICTY currently expends $174 million a year and has been in existence for
fifteen years. The ICTR takes on average 5.9 years to adjudicate a case from custody
to completion. Jean Galbraith, The Pace of lnternational Criminal Justice, 31 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 79, 128 (2009). See generally David Wippman, The Costs of International
Justice, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 861 (2006). Although tremendous logistical
considerations need to be taken into account when viewing these numbers, one factor
that clearly comes into play is the complexity of working with and proving
international crimes. See Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions,
Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 323, 330 - 40 (2009).
76. Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial Reluctance: A New
'Fourteen Points', in MACEDO, supra note 32, at 255 - 56; for examples of how judges
can struggle with the application of international crimes in domestic courts,
FERDINADUSSE, supra note 61, at 115 n.660.
77. FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 105; see also Burke-White, supra note 29,
at 67-68.
78. See FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 113 n.692.
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differs from those applicable at the time the crime was committed.
Some argue that courts violate retrospectivity when they decide to
apply international law that was not specifically codified at the time
the acts occurred.' However, some countries, such as Germany,
recognize an unwritten "natural law" exception for cases such as war
crimes, based on how the interests of justice can override formal
requirements of prohibitions on retrospectivity." This allowed
Germany to prosecute former soldiers who were instructed by
superiors to shoot unarmed civilians trying to scale the Berlin Wall to
enter West Berlin.82
These kinds of challenges prevent many domestic courts from
applying international law, often limiting prosecutions to those of
ordinary crimes available in their respective penal codes. However,
there can also be some advantages to this practice. For example,
many courts have held that crimes against humanity are not
susceptible to statutes of limitation" or amnesty, increasing
opportunities for prosecution." Also, some international courts have
restricted principles of double jeopardy for international crimes. In
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights held that double jeopardy can be restricted when an
"apparent" or "fraudulent" res judicata is produced under certain
circumstances, such as when there is no actual intention of bringing
the alleged perpetrators to justice." The court held that "dictates of
79. See Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on
the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 857, 878 (2009).
80. CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 23 (2006).
81. Id. at 145 - 46.
82. Id.
83. For example, in Priebke, the Supreme Court of Argentina held that no
statute of limitations could be invoked against on the principles in cases of crimes
against humanity in international law. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 11/2/1995, "Priebke, E. s/ solicitud de
extradici6n," (1996-1-324).
84. Claudia Martin, Catching Up with the Past: Recent Decisions of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Addressing Gross Human Rights Violations
Perpetrated During the 1970s-1980s, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 774, 781 (2007). See also
Alberto L. Zuppi, Swinging Back and Forth Between Impunity and Impeachment:
The Struggle for Justice in Latin America and the International Criminal Court, 19
PACE INT'L L. REV. 195, 217 (2007).
85. Almonacid-Arellano et al., v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 44/02, 154 (Sept.
26, 2006).
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justice, rights of the victims and the spirit of the wording of the
American Convention supersede the protection of the [double
jeopardy] principle."" Were this principle to be applied in domestic
courts, prosecutors may have a broader scope of opportunities to
bring heads of state to justice.
Finally, some critics argue that there are factors that make the
application of international law in domestic court more manageable
than others admit. These critics state that although the definitions
may be confusing, it cannot be disputed that case law has been
developed by international tribunals to increasingly provide guidance.
Therefore, although it can be extremely difficult for national courts to
apply international criminal law, there are some advantages in doing
so which bypass various impediments that typically arise under
domestic law.'
2. International Courts
Unlike domestic courts that allow prosecutors to choose from a
wide range of crimes in their penal code to charge the defendant,
international courts have a limited set of crimes over which they have
jurisdiction. This Part considers the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC, and
the SCSL in turn to highlight the narrow types of crimes (also known
as "core crimes") over which international courts have jurisdiction.
a. ICTY
Article I of the ICTY Statute says the "[t]ribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the former territory of
Yugoslavia since 1991" and that were committed as part of the armed
conflict. 9 The report of the U.N. Secretary General that elaborates
on the ICTY Statute specifies that Article I applies only to those
crimes that clearly have become part of customary law." Articles 2
through 5 list these crimes: grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, "violations of the laws or customs of war",
86. Id.
87. FERDINANDUSSE, supra note 61, at 108.
88. Id.
89. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 1.
90. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 33-34, UN Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) [hereinafter UN ICTY Report].
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genocide, and crimes against humanity."
b. ICTR
Similar to the ICTY, the ICTR also has jurisdiction "to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda. .. between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994."92 The ICTR also has
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II.9
However, two notable differences exist between the chargeable
crimes under the jurisdictions of the ICTY and the ICTR. First, the
ICTY defines crimes against humanity as "crimes ... committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and
directed against any civilian population." 94 The ICTR Statute, in
contrast, defines it as: "crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."95 The ICTR's
standard seems more stringent given the necessary evidentiary
showings of a widespread or systematic attack96 and the nexus
requirement that the act be based on national, political, ethnic, racial,
or religious grounds. Second, unlike the ICTY, the ICTR defines war
crimes as violations of common Article III and the Additional
Protocol, which, as a whole, has not been recognized as a part of
customary international law.
The differences between the subject matter jurisdiction of the
ICTY and the ICTR show that choice of venue in the international
arena affects the scope of the crime under which one may be charged.
91. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, arts. 2-5.
92. ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 1.
93. Id. arts. 2-4.
94. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 5.
95. ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 3.
96. Some argue that this difference may be insignificant since the inclusion of
"directed against any civilian population" in the ICTY Statute can be interpreted to
mean something similar to "as part of a widespread and systematic nature."
Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103,
115 (1997).
97. See id. at 116. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 56, at art. 2, with ICTR
Statute, supra note 56, art. 4.
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C. ICC
Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court states that it has "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern" that
have been committed since July 1, 2002. The "serious" crimes that
the ICC has jurisdiction over, as enumerated in Article 5, are
*99genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
Although the crime of aggression appears in the statute, its
proscription will not come into effect until a consensus has been
reached among the negotiators over the crime's definition and
applicability." As compared to the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC
statute has expanded the types of crimes that can constitute both
crimes against humanity and war crimes."o
d. SCSL
Finally, we examine hybrid courts, using the SCSL as an
example. Article 1 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone establishes that the court will have the power to "prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in
the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996."' The crimes
include crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II, "other serious
violations of international humanitarian law," and certain crimes
under Sierra Leonean law.103
Comparing the SCSL statute with those of the international
tribunals further complicates the picture of how the venue can
influence how the prosecution of a head of state proceeds. First, the
crimes against humanity and the war crimes articles generally
resemble those of the ICTR. However, the "other serious violations
of international humanitarian law" clause is a provision which is
98. ICC Statute, supra note 11.
99. Id. art. 5(1).
100. Id. art. 5(2).
101. Compare id. arts. 7-8 with ICTY Statute, supra note 56, arts. 3, 5 and ICTR
Statute, supra note 56, arts. 2-3.
102. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, (2000), http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndlMJeEw%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter, SCSL
Statute].
103. Id. arts. 2-4.
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unique to the SCSL and does not appear in any of the statutes of the
international tribunals. The provision includes the crimes of
intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population,
intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian workers or
peacekeepers, and the conscription of child soldiers.'"
Furthermore, the SCSL statute controversially allows the
prosecution of persons over the age of fifteen.os This demonstrates
the unique nature of how the host government and its representatives
can have a significant influence on determining the boundaries of
jurisdiction of a hybrid court. From its inception, the Sierra Leone
government and representatives of civil society said that the people of
Sierra Leone would not accept a court that does not hold children
accountable for the crimes that they have committed.'06 A number of
human rights advocacy groups objected to this, stressing that it would
set a dangerous precedent and undermine efforts to rehabilitate the
estimated 5,400 children who participated in combat. However, the
Sierra Leonean government decided that not holding those over the
age of fifteen accountable for their crimes would result in impunity."
As a compromise, the SCSL statute specifically states that minors
shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account
his or her young age, promoting his or her rehabilitation,
reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society,
and in accordance with international human rights standards, and in
particular the rights of the child."08
Finally, because the SCSL is a "hybrid court," Article 5 allows
for the prosecution of crimes under Sierra Leonean law. However,
the SCSL enumerates only two types of domestic crimes over which
the court has jurisdiction: offenses related to the abuse of girls under
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act and offenses relating to the
wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act.'0
However, notably, the SCSL has never charged anyone with these
104. Id. art. 4.
105. Id. art. 7.
106. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
establishment of a Special Court for the Sierra Leone, 1 27, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000).
107. Avril D. Haines, Accountability h Sierra Leone: The Role of the Special
Court, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 173,224 - 25 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003).
108. SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art. 7.
109. Id. art. 5.
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national crimes.
B. Modes of Criminal Liability
As asserted in the Tadic decision by the ICTY, the "basic
assumption" exists in international and national laws that "the
foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal
culpability."' 0 For criminal responsibility to be proven, a prosecutor
must apply an available theory of liability to the perpetrator's action
to show personal culpability - a very challenging task for crimes as
complex as genocide. We have seen how the types of crimes a head
of state can be charged with can vary with the type of venue.
Similarly, the manner in which prosecutors can hold defendants liable
also differs among courts. This subsection surveys the different types
of theories of liability that courts allow prosecutors to rely on within
their jurisdiction.
First, we examine a unique theory, called "perpetration by
means" that has been advanced by a number of domestic courts to
prosecute heads of state. We then look at two specific theories
available to prosecutors in international courts. Finally, we look to
the statute of the ICC, which broadened the types of enumerated
theories of liability in international courts.
1. Argentina, Germany, and Peru: Perpetration-by-Means
The theory of perpetration-by-means comes from a German
doctrine of indirect participation called "Organisationsherrschaft"
(domination over an organizational apparatus), crafted by a scholar
named Claus Roxin."' In developing this concept, Roxin argued that
both the direct perpetrator who acts with full criminal responsibility,
as well as the indirect perpetrator who has control over the crime
should be held liable for the crime."2 According to Roxin, the
indirect perpetrator, who controls the hierarchically structured
organization, "just needs to press a button," resulting in an order that
he knows will be probably be implemented, regardless of knowing
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 186 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic].
111. Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss, On the Apphcation of a Theory of
Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir, German Doctrine at the Hague?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 853, 860 (2008).
112. Id.
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who may execute it."' The indirect perpetrator's control over the
"organizational apparatus" enables him to use the direct perpetrator
as "a mere gear in a giant machine" to produce the criminal result
"automatically."114 This approach not only characterizes the direct
perpetrator's actions as knowing and voluntary but depicts the more
powerful party behind the scenes as also having committed an
offense."'
In applying this doctrine in the Fujimoricase, the Supreme Court
of Peru cited an abundance of Peruvian and German doctrine to
legitimize its use. For the specific liability of Fujimori, the court
applied the following type of autorfa mediata: "dominio de la
voluntad en aparatos de poder organizados" (control through the will
of an apparatus of organized power)." It is important to note that
this language used by the Court ("control through the will of an
apparatus of organized power") mirrors the language used by Roxin's
doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft (domination over an
organizational apparatus). The Court further establishes that a
prerequisite to this form of liability is "the prior existence of a
structured organization" that has a "solid linear hierarchy," which
establishes a "vertical route" in "its organizational design" for issuing
orders for crimes that may be committed."' According to the court,
there are two characteristics of such an organization. First, there
needs to be "assigned roles" that define the relationship between the
decision-maker and the executor and second, the organization's
"functional life" needs to develop independently of its members in an
autonomous manner.
Additionally, the Peruvian Supreme Court in Fujimori relied
upon German Supreme Court precedent to require four elements to
be met for this theory to apply."' The Court identifies two
"objective" elements that ensure that the indirect perpetrator
asserted control over the crime: (1) control over the organization and
113. Id.
114. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass
Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1831 - 32 (2005).
115. Id. at 1832.
116. Sala Penal Especial, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Exp. No. AV-19-2001,
Sentencia Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Parte III, Cap. II, 720 (7 April 2009)
[hereinafter Fujimori Sentence].
117. Id. 726.
118. Id. 727.
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(2) a disconnection of the apparatus from a legal order."9 Then, the
Court enumerates two "subjective" elements: the fungibility of the
executors of the order and a high likelihood that the executor will
commit the act." The fungibility element makes this theory unique.
This element assumes that only those in leadership positions possess
the control necessary to immediately replace one executor with
another to completely dominate a criminal plan.'21 This ability makes
that person directing the "cogs of the machine," the main perpetrator
of the crime.122
At least two other examples of the application of this doctrine
are worth mentioning. Argentine judges adopted this method when
convicting the country's former military junta officials for human
rights abuses. German courts have also applied this theory to convict
the superiors of border guards who shot East Germans scaling the
Berlin Wall.12
Additionally, the principle behind this doctrine has been codified
and applied by some of the world's major legal systems, including the
U.S. 124 and the Netherlands.12 ' As we will see in the next subsection,
the ICC's Rome Statute has also codified this doctrine.26 Recently,
119. Id 1728.
120. Id. This is not an official translation. For Spanish and further discussion of
these elements, see Fujimori Sentence Part III, Cap. II 4; Raill Pariona Arana, La
autoria mediata por organizacidn en la Sentencia contra Fujimoi, in 11 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 609, 611 - 14 (2009) [hereinafter
ZIS]; see also IvAn Meini, La autoria mediata por dominio de la organizaci6n en el
caso Fujimor in ZIS, supra, at 603, 603 (2009).
121. Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159, 183 (2007).
122. Id
123. Id; The Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo of the ICC also recently applied
this theory in his indictment of current Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.
Jessberger & Geneuss, supra note 111, at 853.
124. Model Penal Code § 2.06(2) states: "A person is legally accountable for the
conduct of another person when: ... he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to
engage in such conduct ... " MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (1981); Gerhard Werle,
Individual Criminal Responsibity in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
953, 963 (2007).
125. Dutch criminal law has been applying a similar doctrine known as "functional
perpetration" for economic offenses - "employers and managerial staff are capable
of procunng economic offences by prompting others to execute the physical act."
Herman Van Der Wilt, On Functional Perpetration in Dutch Criminal Law: Some
reflections sparked off by the Case Against the Former Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori, in ZIS, supra note 120, at 615 (2009).
126. See Mfra Section II. B. 2.
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the ICTY has also narrowly allowed the application of this doctrine in
Prosecutor v. Stakic.7
2. ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL: Direct Responsibility, Indirect Command
Responsibility and Joint Criminal Enterprise
The statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL all have
identical provisions regarding modes of criminal liability (with the
exception of an additional paragraph in the SCSL Statute, for those
crimes in which Sierra Leonean law applies).'28 Notably, for our
purposes, all three statutes specify the following:
The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.'
These statutes generally provide for three modes of criminal
liability. First, as enumerated in Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute,
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, and Article 7(1) of the SCLS
statute, there are five forms of "direct responsibility" under which a
defendant can be charged: when a person "planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, or execution of a crime." 0
Second, international courts have inferred and applied a doctrine
called "joint criminal enterprise" from the aforementioned statutes.
This doctrine originally emerged from the ICTY case Prosecutor v.
Tadic."' In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber reviewed the language of
ICTY Statute Article 7(1) and found that responsibility for crimes
ensuing from group criminality can attach to all those members of the
group who shared the common purpose of the group to commit the
crimes and had in some way actively furthered the crime. 32 The
127. Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A Judgment (Mar. 22, 2006),
available athttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb550.html.
128. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 7; SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art. 6.
129. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 7(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 6(2);
SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art. 7(2).
130. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 7(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 6(1);
SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art. 7(1).
131. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. R. 75, 103-10 (2005); Harmen Van Der Wilt, Joint Cniminal
Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 91,96 (2007).
132. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 110, 1 196.
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Appeals Chamber of the ICTY restated this "common purpose"
element as requiring the perpetrator to have entered into an
agreement with other members of a joint criminal enterprise to
commit crimes.33
In addition to cases with perpetrators of a common purpose,
Tadic identified two other categories of cases in which the doctrine of
joint criminal enterprise applies. A second category consists of what
are known as "concentration camp" cases, where the accused can be
found guilty if he or she was aware of the system of repression and
intended to further the common design to mistreat the inmates.134 A
third category of cases involves defendants who committed acts that
fall outside the "common purpose." According to Tadic, even if the
act fell outside the common purpose, the defendant can be held liable
if the crime resulted as a "natural and foreseeable consequence of the
effecting of that common purpose."
Since Tadic, the ICTY has been steadily developing case law on
all three categories of joint criminal enterprise. This doctrine was
used to indict Milosevic in the ICTY136 and to charge officials with
genocide and even for acts of sexual violence in the ICTR.'3  The
SCSL also applied this doctrine in the original indictment of former
President Charles Taylor.'
Finally, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL have inferred a third
doctrine of criminal liability, known as "indirect command
responsibility" from the following common provision:
The fact that any of the acts ... was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.39
133. Prosecutor v. Multinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoijub
Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 23 (May 21, 2003),
citedin Danner & Martinez, supra note 131, at 105.
134. Van Der Wilt, supra note 125, at 96.
135. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 110, 1 204.
136. Danner & Martinez, supra note 131, at 107.
137. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR 2001-65-T, Judgment and
Sentence 8 (Sept. 1, 2006) andProsecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-
T, Judgment and Sentence 23 (Sept. 20, 2006).
138. Taylor Indictment, supra note 57, IT 23-26.
139. ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 6(3);
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This theory of liability holds superiors responsible for any
omissions, such as "failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful
behaviour of subordinates."' The indirect command responsibility
doctrine under the case law of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL requires
the following three elements: the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship of effective control; the existence of the requisite mens
rea, namely that the commander knew or had reason to know of his
subordinates' crimes; and that the commander failed to take the
necessary steps to prevent or punish the offenses.141
The application of these elements varies. The determination of
mens rea, as well as what necessary and appropriate steps have been
taken to prevent crimes, can significantly change with different
factual circumstances.142
3. ICC Article 25(3): A Catch-all?
The construction and language of ICC Article 25(3) that
enumerates the modes of criminal liability under which defendants
can be charged differs remarkably from the common language of the
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL:
In accordance with this statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that
other person is criminally responsible;
Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in
fact occurs or is attempted;
For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission;
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art. 7(3).
140. UN ICTY Report, supra note 90, 1 56.
141. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber, 486
(Sept. 2, 1998) [ICTR]; Prosecutor v. Brima, et. al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T,
Judgment, 760-62 (June 20, 2007) JSCSL]; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-
21-T, Judgment, 1 346, (Nov. 16, 1998) [ICTY].
142. Compare Prosecutor v. Blaskie, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 1 294 (Mar.
3, 2000), with Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T
Judgment, 1 147 (May 21, 1999).
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common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
Be made in knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
crime[.]'
The first striking difference between the prior statutes and
Article 25(3) is the structure - the Rome Statute goes beyond simply
enumerating the different modes of participation by classifying them
into four levels: "(a) the commission of the crime; (b) ordering and
soliciting and inducement; (c) aiding and abetting; and (d)
contribution to a crime by a group of persons with a common
purpose."l"
In comparing Article 25(3) with statutes establishing the
jurisdiction of the other international courts, it is particularly worth
examining sections (a) and (d) in detail. Beginning with Article
25(3)(a), the ICC statute provides for three different forms of
commission, two of which have never been codified in other statutes
of international courts: joint commission (a variation of joint criminal
enterprise) and commission through another (what seems to be
similar if not the equivalent of perpetration-by-means).
Compared to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in the
other international courts, the ICC has a relatively high requirement
for a defendant to be found liable for joint commission. The
contribution of the accused towards the crime must be of such a
nature that, jointly with his co-perpetrators, s/he controls the
commission of the crime to the extent that withholding the
contribution would frustrate the execution of the common plan.'45
Additionally, the mens rea for each co-perpetrator must be proven
for joint commission.146
143. Compare ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 25, with ICTY Statute, supra note
56, art. 7, ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 6, and SCSL Statute, supra note 102, art.
7.
144. Werle, supra note 124, at 956.
145. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 1 322 (Jan. 29 2007); Steffen Wirth, Committing Liability in
International Criminal Law, in CARSTEN STAHN & GORAN SLUITER, THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 329,331 (2009).
146. Wirth, supra note 145, at 331.
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The ICC is the first international court to officially recognize a
variation of perpetration-by-means. Keeping with the principles
underlying the original German doctrine, the provision explicitly
states that liability arises regardless of whether or not the direct
perpetrator of the crime has the mens rea required for the crime.'47 in
the Lubanga decision, the ICC reinforced this requirement, finding
that indirect perpetration is possible in all cases where the accused
controls the will of the person carrying out the crime itself.148
In addition, it should be noted that Article 25(3)(a) leaves out
the doctrine of commission by omission or indirect command
responsibility, which is listed in the statutes of the other international
courts within the sections enumerating modes of criminal liability.
Instead, the Rome Statute devotes an entire article, Article 28, to the
issue of responsibility of commanders and other superiors.149 Some
characterize Article 28 as creating a separate crime of omissiono by
requiring that the crime of subordinates be "a result" of the superiors'
"failure to exercise control properly."'5' Article 28's scope goes
beyond the traditional requirement of indirect command
responsibility and can even run counter to ICTY case law.'52
Next, looking at Article 25(3)(d), the ICC Statute created a new
form of criminal participation: any contribution to the commission of
a crime or an attempted crime by a group by acting in furtherance of,
or with knowledge of a common purpose. This provision seems to
apply to indirect forms of assistance, such as financing a group that
committed atrocities.'53 However, the ICC has interpreted this mode
of criminal participation as weaker than incitement or aiding and
abetting as there is no substantial effect on the commission of the
actual crime.'
In comparison to the other international criminal tribunals, these
new developments with the ICC may have a significant impact in
proceedings to prosecute heads of state. Prior to the ICC,
147. Id. at 335.
148. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, at 322.
149. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 28.
150. Ambos, supra note 121, at 176.
151. ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 28.
152. See Prosecutor v. Naser Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Chamber, 1 338
(June 30, 2006).
153. Werle, supra note 124, at 970.
154. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 337.
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prosecutors were tied to limited modes of criminal liability. The
expansion provided by the ICC statute may seem marginal but may
be enough to allow for the necessary flexibility to more accurately
hold heads of state accountable for their actions.
IV. Contrasting Three Situations
Parts I and II described how heads of state can be prosecuted in
national, international, and hybrid courts, each of which have distinct
characteristics, including varying types of chargeable crimes and
modes of criminal liability. This Section illustrates how variations of
these factors have affected the outcome of three very different trials.
A. Alberto Fujimori: Conviction in Peru
1. Background
Between 1980 and 2000, Peru experienced two decades of
violence and strife, as a series of conflicts led to the deaths of roughly
69,000 people.5"' It would be false to state that Fujimori did not have
any positive impact on Peru during his presidency. It should be
acknowledged that Fujimori helped quell the gruesome terrorism of
the Communist Party of Peru (a.k.a. the Shining Path)"' and assisted
the country in regaining economic stability. At the same time,
Fujimori was also known for his ruthless actions that led to the
commission of mass atrocities. During the early days of his rule,
Fujimori was confronted with an opposition-controlled parliament
that refused to support his agenda.'17 In 1992, with the backing of
Peru's armed forces, Fujimori dissolved the parliament in a "self-
coup," completely taking over the government. As part of a strategy
to eliminate any opposition, Fujimori worked with the Colina Group,
a secret squad of military and intelligence operatives, allegedly
ordering of a series of extrajudicial killings and "disappearances."
Given these atrocities, as well as the massive embezzlement of
state funds, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru
155. LA COMISION DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACION, PERU, FINAL REPORT Vol.
2, 2.3 (2003), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/.
156. Id. at vol. 1, 1.1
157. Ronald Gamarra, A Leader Takes Fhght: The Indictment of Alberto
Fujimori, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE, supra note 8, at 97.
158. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROBABLE CAUSE: EVIDENCE IMPLICATING
FUJIMORI 4 (2005).
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("Truth Commission") described the Fujimori regime as one of
"subversive action, authoritarianism, and corruption."' Some of the
most notable incidents of human rights violations occurred in the
massacres of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, where members of the
Colina Group and the Army Intelligence Service kidnapped, tortured,
and massacred innocent civilians.16
After a series of scandals triggered the collapse of the Fujimori
government, the president fled to Japan. The new government in
Peru initiated a number of positive reforms, such as creating the
Truth Commission mentioned above and signing back on to the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court."' This became significant
as the Inter-American Court held in 2001 that the Peruvian state was
responsible for the Barrios Altos massacre and ordered Peru to
investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible. 62  As the
government began to prosecute dozens of police and military officials
and rebel leaders for their crimes, Fujimori left his safe haven in
Japan in 2005 for Chile where he was arrested.
After some negotiation and litigation, the Chilean Supreme
Court ordered Fujimori's extradition in 2007 to Peru on the basis of
well-founded presumptions of responsibility for seven cases of human
rights violations, corruption, and abuse of authority."' Fujimori's trial
for the human rights charges commenced on December 10, 2007.'6
The trial, which was praised as fair and impartial by both victims and
the international community, resulted in Fujimori's conviction of
aggravated homicide, assault, and kidnapping"' under the theory of
autoria mediata on April 7, 2009.1'
159. Rudolph E. Brandes, Who's Afraid of Universal Jurisdiction: The Fujimori
Case, 15 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 123, 131 (2008).
160. See Gamarra, supra note 157, at 100-01.
161. Burt, supra note 14, at 390.
162. Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru (Barrios Altos Case), Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, (Mar. 14, 2001).
163. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Chile: Supreme Court Extradites
Fujimori (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/es/news/2007/09/21/chile-corte-
suprema-extradita-fujimori.
164. Simon Romero, Peru's Ex-President Convicted of Rights Abuses, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/americas/08fujimori.
html.
165. Fujimori Sentence, supra note 116.
166. Id at Parte III, Cap. II, "La Autorfa Mediata por Dominio de la Voluntad en
Aparatos de Poder Organizados"; see also Romero, supra note 164.
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2. Fujimori's Trial
a. Chargeable Crimes
Unlike the examples that will follow (Milosevic and Taylor),
Fujimori was charged with crimes from a national penal code.' As
international crimes are not codified in Peru's penal code, Fujimori
was not officially charged under international law. Some argue that
Fujimori's conviction based on domestic legislation was of
fundamental importance to constructing local legitimacy of the
process and achieving greater societal acceptance of the final
outcome."' However, considering how the conviction of a head of
state ultimately leads to the vindication of those who suffered under
their hands, others may question this and advocate for the more
serious international crimes to have been charged to impose
maximum accountability. Yet, several unique aspects of Fujimori's
case suggest otherwise.
First, Fujimori was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, the
maximum penalty under the crimes with which he was charged.16 9
Given that he was seventy-one years old when he was sentenced,
twenty-five years is essentially equivalent to a life sentence for him.
Second, for these crimes, he was ordered to pay reparations of
$60,000 to the families of the victims in the Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta cases, as well as $15,000 to the families of the victims in two
other cases."7
Third, and, perhaps most importantly for our purposes, although
the conviction resulted from "plain vanilla" crimes from the Peruvian
penal code, the Supreme Court of Peru nevertheless mentioned in its
opinion that Fujimori's offenses amounted to "crimes against
167. An important thing to note is that, in addition to the trial for the Barrios
Altos and other massacres, Fujimori was also prosecuted in three other trials for
abuse of power and various corruption and embezzlement charges. Given the
complex nature of each of the charges, separating the trials this way allowed each of
the trials to run much smoother than they would have if all charges had been tried
together. This note focuses only on the trial regarding the human rights violations
committed during the massacres. See Fujimori gets lengthy jail term, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/7986951.stm; Fujimori convicted of
corruption, BBC NEWS, July 20, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/8160150.
stm; see also Fujimori pleads guilty to bribery, BBC NEWS, Sept. 22, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk /2/hilamericas/8279528.stm.
168. Burt, supra note 14, at 403.
169. Burt, supra note 14, at 384.
170. Id, 1707.
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humanity," citing definitions from the Nuremburg tribunals, the
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC."' The Court went as far as to apply
these definitions to the massacres that Fujimori ordered in Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta.02 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that
Fujimori committed "human rights violations under national and
international law.""' By including this kind of language, the Supreme
Court of Peru convicted a head of state with national crimes for
practical purposes in terms of indictment and sentencing, yet also still
officially and publically stressed the gravity for the broader atrocities
he committed. Where domestic courts have the capability to try their
former heads of state as Peru did, the Fujimori case suggests that
domestic courts, even when only using their existing domestic laws,
have the ability to attribute the proper amount of accountability to
high-level perpetrators.
b. Autoria Mediata
The Supreme Court of Peru used the theory of autoria mediate, a
version of perpetration-by-means used by a number of national courts
to hold heads of state accountable for crimes committed by those
under their control, in convicting Fujimori. Recognizing the
uniqueness of the application of this doctrine, the Court spent
roughly thirty pages explaining and elaborating on the doctrine itself,
tracing its origins from Roxin's theory.14
The Court first looked at the objective elements of the theory
and started by acknowledging that, as president, Fujimori had the
power to control the political and military conduct and strategies of
Peru."' This satisfied the first element of control that the Court
enumerated in defining autorfa mediata. Additionally, because
Fujimori took over the parliament in a coup, he was in a position with
no opposition. Thus, he also satisfied the second element of lack of
connection with a legal order."' The Court then found that because
Fujimori was supported by both the head of the National Intelligence
Service and the General of the Army, he had control over a vertical,
171. Id. 710-17.
172. Id.
173. Id 746.
174. Id. $$ 718-44.
175. Id. $ 745(1).
176. Id.
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hierarchical apparatus.1"' Through this structure, Fujimori used the
secret service and the military - units that were characterized as
subordinate to the president, to carry out his orders.17 ' Fujimori
transmitted orders to physically eliminate members or supporters of
alleged terrorist groups in various ways; these orders were further
hierarchically retransmitted to other agents of the secret service or
the military.'7 ' The Court found that the atrocities committed in
Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, and similar incidents were actions that
were executed to carry out these orders.'"
Next, in addressing the subjective elements, the Court
acknowledged the fungibility of the executors (intelligence and
military officials)."' Due to the fact that there were countless
intelligence and military officials that could have performed the acts
their superiors ordered, the Court regarded the actual direct
perpetrators as replaceable with any of their other colleagues.1
Then, the Court recognized that Fujimori's position at the apex of the
Peruvian political and military apparatus ensured that the crimes
were committed by any of the fungible, subordinate "cogs of the
machine.""
Despite its lengthy academic discourse describing the doctrine
itself, the Court's straightforward analysis applying it was barely over
a page. The Court's simple analysis illustrates how this doctrine can
be used effectively and efficiently for heads of state. The Court easily
found that a former president had the capability to give orders to any
fungible, military agent who could execute atrocities. In comparison,
it may not have been so easy to find a "common purpose" to establish
joint criminal enterprise or establish that Fujimori had the mens rea
of allowing the crimes to happen under indirect command
responsibility, theories applied in international courts like the ICTR
and the ICTY.
The Court's use of this theory in Peru highlights how flexibility in
theories of criminal liability may be better suited for these kinds of
high-level cases. The Fujimori case suggests that autorfa mediata may
177. Id. 745(2).
178. Id. 745(3).
179. Id. 745(4)-(5).
180. Id. %1745(6)-(7).
181. Id. 745(8).
182. Id.
183. Id.1748.
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be a very effective vehicle to find heads of state accountable for
atrocities. This is not the first time this doctrine has been used in
national courts - Argentina also applied it successfully in the case
against military junta members." Peru's use of this theory further
legitimizes using the theory against heads of state. It is interesting to
note that this doctrine has now been codified in the ICC statute and
the ICC prosecutor has already applied it in his indictment of
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.185
B. Slobodan Milosevic: Challenges at the ICTY
1. Background
It exceeds the scope of this note to detail an account of the
numerous conflicts in the Balkans that resulted in the deaths of
millions"' or the circumstances that gave rise to Slobodan Milosevic's
power. However, it is important to establish a basic understanding of
the degree to which Milosevic influenced and controlled many aspects
of the atrocities that were committed during the 1990s in Serbia,
Croatia, and Bosnia.
Between September 1987 and January 1990, Milosevic effectively
controlled a large part of the Balkans by taking over the reins of the
Serbian Communist party, engineering a virtual coup in Montenegro,
abolishing the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina,
and seizing command of the Yugoslav People's Army."7 Milosevic
then turned to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He began to
arm the Serbian communities within those provinces. The conflict
that Milosevic ignited spiraled out of control and led to some of the
worst instances of mass atrocities the world has witnessed since the
Holocaust. In one fell swoop, Serbian forces killed up to 8,000
Muslims in the infamous massacre of Srebrenica." Then, in 1999,
Milosevic turned to Kosovo and drove about 850,000 Kosoar
Albanians from their homes using similar tactics as those used in
184. Osiel, supra note 114, at 1836.
185. Prosecutor v. Omar al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest
for Oman Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Int'l Crim. Court Mar. 4,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
186. Emir Suljagic, Justice Squandered? The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic, in
PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE, supra note 8, at 176,178.
187. Id.
188. See generally POWER, supra note 37, ch. 11 (Srebrenica).
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Croatia and Bosnia.
On May 27, 1999, the ICTY announced the indictment of
Milosevic, former president of Serbia and then current President of
Yugoslavia, originally for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Kosovo.'" However, six months after the indictment,
Milosevic was ousted from power, and the new Yugoslav president,
Vojislav Kostunica, refused to recognize the primacy of the
international tribunals over national law and wanted to try Milosevic
in Belgrade.'9' The Kostunica government wanted to avoid a
transparent, international trial, widely covered by the media, to
prevent the publicity of the role the Serbian government had in the
egregious atrocities that Milosevic organized.'" Furthermore, Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina sued the government of Yugoslavia in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violating the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."' The
government of Yugoslavia did not want public evidence uncovered in
the ICTY proceeding against Milosevic to undermine their own
defense in the ICJ.
However, some arguments existed for the Kostunica government
to eventually cooperate with the ICTY. First, Serbia wanted to give
the impression that it was "cracking down on war crimes."19 4 Second,
some believe that Serbians wanted to focus on ICTY's "justice" as a
means to secure economic support for their devastated economy.195
Although a preliminary indictment was issued against Milosevic
by Belgrade, an arrest operation was foiled by Milosevic supporters in
the Yugoslav Army, resulting in a national embarrassment for the
government of Serbia. Milosevic continued pulling strings to resist
extradition to The Hague. Even after the Serbian government issued
a formal decree to extradite Milosevic to The Hague, the Federal
Supreme Court, presided over by judges still loyal to Milosevic,
ordered that the decree be suspended on June 28, 2001.'96 However,
189. Suljagic, supra note 186, at 179.
190. Press Release, ICTY, supra note 42.
191. Suljagic, supra note 186, at 180.
192. Id.
193. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11).
194. ADAM M. SMITH, AFTER GENOCIDE 270 (2009).
195. Id. at 271.
196. Id.
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because of intense international pressure mounting for the case to be
tried in The Hague,'" the government of Serbia overruled the
Supreme Court on the same day the suspension decree was issued."
The Serbian government gave primacy to the ICTY Statute over
domestic legislation to cooperate with the tribunal and officially
ordered Milosevic's release.'9
During the period between his indictment and his arrest, the
ICTY prosecutor issued further indictments amounting to sixty-six
counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes under
Articles 7(1) and 7(3) under the theories of joint criminal enterprise
and superior authority (indirect command responsibility).2m
Milosevic's trial lasted for four years and, tragically, just ten working
days before what was scheduled to be the end of his trial, Milosevic
died in his jail cell at The Hague.20 1
2. Challenges of Milosevic's Trial
Milosevic originally had three operative indictments at the
ICTY, relating to crimes committed in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia.
Unlike in the Fujimori case where charges were separated into four
trials, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY joined these indictments,
determining that the crimes in all three cases arose "out of the same
transaction."2 02 Although a discussion of the validity of this joinder is
out of the scope of this note, it should be noted that a number of
allegations within the three indictments did not completely match up,
including the types of crimes under which Milosevic was charged.203
197. See Suljagic, supra note 186, at 180 - 83; Scott Grosscup, The Trial of
Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State Immunity and the Specter of
Victor's Justice, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 355, 364 - 66 (2004).
198. Suljagic, supra note 186, at 182.
199. Id.
200. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, IT-02-54, Second Amended Indictment, $1
5-33 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004) [hereinafter,
Milosevic joint indictment].
201. Marlise Simons & Gregory Crouch, Miosevie is Found Dead in Cell, U.N
officials say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/
internationalleurope/12hague.html.
202. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR73, IT 01-51-AR73, Decision
on Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal From Refusal to Order Joinder (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 1, 2002), http:/www.icty.orglx/cases/slobodan
milosevic/acdec/en/20201JD317089.htm.
203. For a discussion of the problems of this joinder, see GIDEON BOAS, THE
MILOSEvIC TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 79 - 130 (2007).
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In any event, the case covered three conflicts over eight years and
contained sixty-six counts with over 7,000 allegations.20
The final indictment charged Milosevic with genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes under all forms of liability listed
under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. He was charged with having
"planned, instigated, ordered, committed," or having "otherwise
aided and abetted in the[ir] planning, preparation, or execution."205
The indictment further relied on the two major theories of indirect
criminal responsibility that the ICTY authorizes. First, the
indictments specified that "committing" refers to "participation in a
joint criminal enterprise as a co-perpetrator" in order to "exp[el] a
substantial portion of" the Kosovo Albanian, Croatian or Bosnian
population. 206 The indictment also held Milosevic liable under Article
7(3), as the president of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces of the former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), and the president of the Supreme Defense
Counsel for the acts or omissions of his subordinates." The
prosecution clarified that the constitutional structure of the FRY and
Serbia allowed for Milosevic, as the head of state, to be responsible
for commanding the Armed Forces and the Supreme Defense
Council.208  The crux of the prosecution's argument was that
Milosevic's involvement in a joint criminal enterprise and/or his
superior responsibility operated in a way to allow him to command
the Serbian political and military branches to commit egregious
crimes to obtain an ethnically pure region to advance his plan of
creating a Greater Serbia.20
As Milosevic's trial progressed, at least two major challenges
clearly stood out. First, especially as the ICTY allowed Milosevic to
represent himself, many criticized the trial for having been highly
politicized.210 Second, throughout the trial, the prosecution faced
some substantial challenges in finding credible evidence, due to the
ICTY's inability to prevent Milosevic from receiving assistance from
his supporters in the Yugoslav Army and the Secret Service. The
204. Id. at 129.
205. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, supra note 200, 16.
206. Id.
207. Id. I 27-28.
208. Id 83.
209. Id
210. Suljagic, supra note 186, at 182.
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problems stemmed from the formation of a Commission on
Cooperation between the ICTY and the Yugoslav Army General's
staff office to facilitate Milosevic's defense. 21' Behind this support was
an alliance between the Yugoslav president and what has become
known as the "anti-Hague" lobby - members of the former Serbian
military and police.212 As noted earlier, the government was
especially fearful of evidence being produced in the ICTY trial
against Milosevic that could be used against the Serbian government
in the ongoing ICJ case. The Yugoslav government opposed or
obstructed numerous requests by the prosecution to obtain critical
documents. The prosecutor of the ICTY noted in an address to the
United Nations that the majority of the replies to requests for
documents "were either not substantive or partial when not reduced
to bland statements that the requested files or documents 'had not
been found, or were destroyed during NATO bombings."2 13
Additionally, after "military archives [have been] closed to us, even in
investigations where Serbs are the victims ... we have been recently
informed that some requested documents have now been
destroyed."2 14
Second, given the enormity of the joint indictment, the Trial
Chamber also had to impose numerous restrictions and deadlines on
the prosecution in order to manage the size of the case. 215  For
example, the prosecution opted to prove genocide in only seven
municipalities in Bosnia, as opposed to the initial number of thirty-
three.216 Critics of the prosecution's case argue that, rather than
causing things to become overly broad, complex and unmanageable,
the prosecution should have focused "on the core criminal conduct of
the accused and select[ed] ... representational crimes to establish the
case." 217 This kind of a focus may have limited the scope of what the
prosecution had to present, including the several hundred witnesses
that testified and would have allowed all parties involved to narrowly
211. Id. at 187.
212. Id.
213. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, Address by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Mrs. Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations
Security Council (Oct. 30, 2002), http://www.icty.org/sid/8056.
214. Id
215. See generallySuljagic, supra note 186.
216. Id at 184.
217. Id at 128.
378 [Vol. 34:2
Prosecuting Heads of State
focus on a specific part of the conflict within clear temporal and
geographic boundaries. Another perspective under consideration was
how a trial of sixty-six counts over a ten-year period of war not only
taxes the capacity of the court and the prosecution but also the rights
of the accused in being able to obtain a fair and expeditious trial.218
The scope and size of the trial came not only from the quantity
but also the quality of the charged crimes. Had Milosevic been
charged with sixty-six counts of what national courts commonly
consider murder, the trial may have been less taxing on the Court.
However, the scope of the charges of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes traditionally require substantially more
evidence to prove,219 particularly given complex mens rea arguments
and theories of criminal liability. Proving a physical act such as
murder suddenly seems simple in comparison to proving something
such as genocide, which is defined by the ICTY as "[acts] committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group."
In addition, the prosecution decided to charge Milosevic under
every theory of liability possible under the ICTY Statute. The trial
chamber controversially neglected to catch this for the Milosevic
indictments; however, ICTY procedure and case law generally
require the prosecution to plead all states of mind for all the crimes
charged under each theory of liability and also plead all the material
facts that prove each theory.221 Especially when proving something as
complex as the mens rea of genocide, it becomes critical to have a
simple yet effective theory of criminal liability to hold the perpetrator
liable. Proving a "common purpose" with others in forming a joint
criminal enterprise to commit this complex crime already requires
numerous layers of analysis that necessitate volumes of evidence.
The charges by the prosecution seemed to be over-broad, excessive,
and even cumbersome. Given these considerations, choosing the
crime to be charged and the theory of liability for such large scale
trials can become critical.
218. Gillian Higgins, The Impact of the Size, Scope, and Scale of the Milosevic
Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis Before the ICTY, 7 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM.
RTs. 239, 260 (2009).
219. See generally Galbraith, supra note 75.
220. ICTY Statute, supra note 56, art. 4.
221. BOAS, supra note 203, at 104, 108 - 09.
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C. Charles Taylor in SCSL
1. Background
Originally a warlord in Liberia, former Liberian president
Charles Taylor was responsible for countless acts of violence and
corruption during the civil and regional wars of Liberia in the 1990s. 222
However, given the jurisdiction of the SCSL, this note only considers
the crimes he was responsible for committing through a number of
different armed factions in the civil war of Sierra Leone in the 1990s.
The conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s began with Charles Taylor
supporting members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to
invade Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991. As the power balance
continued to shift between the government and the rebels, Sierra
Leone spiraled into chaos by the mid-1990s. 223 Although multi-party
elections were held and a president was elected in 1996 who
successfully signed a peace accord with the RUF, a military group
known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) quickly
overthrew the new government in 1997.224 After the AFRC merged
with the RUF, both forces began to control the diamond-rich
territories of the country and committed egregious human rights
violations, including systematic killings, sexual slavery, forced labor,
and conscription of child soldiers.225
Human Rights Watch estimates that by 1999, 50,000 people had
died and 1 million had been displaced.226 It is also estimated that half
of those killed in the conflict were children.227 The mass atrocities
finally came to an end with the signing of the Lome Peace Accord
between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone in 1999. A
truth and reconciliation commission was established in July 2002.22
222. Tejan-Cole, supra note 58, at 205 - 06.
223. Haines, supra note 107, at 177 - 79.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 179 - 81; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOWING TERROR: ATROCITIES
AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SIERRA LEONE (1998), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
1998/07/29/sowing-terror.
226. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Shocking War Crimes in Sierra Leone:
New Testimonies on Mutilation, Rape of Civilians (June 24, 1999), http://www.hrw.
org/en/news/1999/06/24/shocking-war-crimes-sierra-leone.
227. Haines, supra note 107, at 222.
228. For more information on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, see generally PAUL JAMEs-ALLEN ET AL., SIERRA LEONE'S TRUTH &
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND SPECIAL COURT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK (2003),
available athttp://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/094.pdf.
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The SCSL commenced its investigations of these events after it
was created in 2002. The first man on its list to indict was Charles
Taylor. He was indicted in March 2003.229 The court then issued
public indictments for the main leaders of the RUF and the AFRC
that included factual allegations that Taylor was a key supporter of
the rebel groups while serving as the Liberian president.'
Meanwhile, although the chaos in Sierra Leone had calmed
down, the civil war in Liberia had been escalating. By 2003, rebel
groups were regularly threatening the capital in Liberia, Taylor's grip
on power there loosened and international diplomatic efforts were at
their peak. In June 2003, African leaders, U.S. diplomats and Charles
Taylor personally met in Accra, Ghana to participate in peace talks.23 1
On June 4, 2003, while Taylor was attending the opening day of the
peace talks in Liberia, the Special Court controversially unsealed his
indictment and appealed to Ghanian authorities to arrest President
Taylor for war crimes and transfer him to the SCSL. Ghana refused
and Taylor was flown back to Liberia, after which he vacated his
presidency and fled to Nigeria. Finally, after tremendous
international pressure, Nigeria's government ceded and transferred
Taylor to the SCSL in February 2005.232
After being transferred into the custody of the SCSL, officials at
the Special Court expressed concern about allowing Taylor to stand
trial in Freetown, fearing rescue attempts or renewed fighting.233 The
Appeal Chamber of the SCSL allowed for Taylor to be moved to The
Hague to be tried in a special courtroom at the ICC but still under
SCSL jurisdiction.2 However, some speculate that the main impetus
for this change in venue was a political deal among Liberia, the
United States, the African Union, and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).235
Taylor currently stands trial in The Hague under the jurisdiction
of the SCSL for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the
229. Taylor Indictment, supra note 57.
230. See Tejan-Cole, supra note 58, at 211.
231. Id. at 215 - 18.
232. Id.
233. Press Release, supra note 60.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Thierry Cruvellier, Why Try Taylor in the Hague?, INT'L JUSTICE
TRIBUNE, No. 44, Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.rnw.n1/int-justice/article/why-try-taylor-
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conscription of child soldiers. In 2007, the prosecution amended the
indictment to drop the use of the joint criminal enterprise theory and,
instead, hold Taylor liable for a form of direct responsibility under
Article 6.1 of the SCSL statute, such as planning, instigating,
ordering, aiding and abetting, and/or the theory of joint criminal
enterprise that can be inferred from Article 6.1, and/or superior
responsibility (indirect command responsibility) under Article 6.3 of
the SCSL statute.236
2. Taylor's Trial
There are two unique factors to highlight regarding Taylor's
currently ongoing trial for our purposes: the scope of the charges
against Taylor in his indictment as compared to those with which
Milosevic was charged and the treatment of the theory of joint
criminal enterprise throughout the trial so far.
First, especially when compared with the Milosevic joint
indictment, the Taylor indictment had a much more manageable
number of crimes that the prosecution sought to prove.237 Compared
to the sixty-six counts in the Milosevic complaint that each covered a
variety of incidents within multiple conflicts, Taylor was indicted for
seventeen counts, many of which related to the same incidents.238 The
prosecution in Taylor's case managed to present their case in a little
over a year, calling ninety-one witnesses between January 7, 2008,
and February 27, 2009.23
In addition to the reasonable number of crimes, another unique
aspect of the amended Taylor indictment was that it does not allege
an overarching theory of common purpose to prove a joint criminal
enterprise.24 Yet, at the same time, this has caused a number of
problems in the trial. The original indictment expressly included the
theory of joint criminal enterprise. However, the prosecution
dropped the term in their amended indictment but kept in the clause
236. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-I, Second
Amended Indictment (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.sc-s.org/CASES/
ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (hereinafter, Taylor Second
Amended Indictment].
237. See generally id., Milosevic joint indictment, supra note 200.
238. Id.
239. Alpha Sesay, The Prosecution's Case: What Happened?, THE TRIAL OF
CHARLES TAYLOR, July 7, 2009, http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/ 2009/07/07/the-
prosecution-case-a-summary/.
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encapsulating crimes "involved within a common plan, design, or
purpose in which the ACCUSED participated or were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of such common plan, design or purpose." 241
The Appeals Chamber ruled that this essentially is the same thing as
arguing a theory of joint criminal enterprise.242 Initially, the
prosecution argued that Taylor participated in a common plan to
achieve and hold political power and physical control over the civilian
population through a campaign of terror.243 Yet, later in the trial, the
prosecution alleged that the purpose of carrying out the campaign of
terror was "to pillage the resources of Sierra Leone, in particular the
diamonds, and to forcibly control the population and territory of
Sierra Leone."2 This oscillation of what the common plan was may
have weakened the case against Taylor.245 Especially given the fact
that the prosecution has failed to prove that Taylor was ever present
in Sierra Leone during these crimes, it seems that establishing the link
between Taylor and the RUK and AFRP and selecting the
appropriate theory of liability will become critical for the
246prosecution.
D. Lessons Learned
These three cases demonstrate how the crimes with which heads
of state are charged and how they are held liable can significantly
impact the progress of the trial. Fujimori's case demonstrates that a
trial of a head of state by a domestic court can successfully lead to a
legitimate conviction and sentence, as long as it has the institutional
capacity to offer a fair and impartial trial. As Fujimori's trial
illustrates, prosecutors in domestic courts have a wide array of laws
from their penal code to prosecute the head of state without any
enumerated limits on theories of criminal liability. Milosevic's case
241. Taylor Second Amended Indictment, supra note 236, [ 33.
242. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, Decision
on 'Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions Regarding The Majority Decision
Concerning The Pleading of JCE in The Second Amended Indictment', 1 19 (May 1,
2009), http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1EKHD1m52qM%3d&tabid=
159.
243. Cecily Rose, Troubled Indictments at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The
Pleading of Joint Criminal Enterprise and Sex-Based Crimes, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
353, 363 (2009).
244. Taylor Second Amended Indictment, supra note 236, quoted in Rose, supra
note 243, at 364.
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shows how the complex international crimes prescribed in
international tribunals, such as genocide, can be extremely difficult to
prove and can result in an excessively long and costly trial. Taylor's
trial shows that, even if the crimes are laid out clearly, the theory of
liability under which the crimes are charged is a fundamental
consideration when prosecuting a head of state. The Fujimori case
maneuvered this hurdle well by being an innovator in applying the
theory of perpetration-by-means - a theory of liability which the ICC
has adopted and recently seems to be implementing.
We cannot yet examine how the two factors of chargeable crimes
and modes of criminal liability have played out within the ICC, which
has expanded both aspects as compared to other international
tribunals. The effects of these developments may soon be seen, as the
ICC has decided to move forward with the case against Sudanese
president Omar al-Bashir on the charges of crime against humanity
and war crimes.247 Bashir has also been charged with genocide, which
the Appeals Chamber has recently remanded for the pre-trial
chamber to reconsider 2 4 Notably, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno
Ocampo has decided to pursue the crimes on the theory of
perpetration-by-means, having experience using it to convict former
members of the Argentine junta.249 How Bashir's case proceeds,
assuming he is successfully transferred to The Hague, will provide
substantial guidance in demonstrating where and how heads of state
should be charged when the home country is incapable of holding a
fair and impartial trial.
V. Conclusion
Today, regions of the Middle East and North Africa lie in a state
of potential revolution, as rebel groups and civilians attempt to
instigate transitions to civilian-led governments.250 Beginning with
Tunisia and Egypt, protestors have taken to the streets in almost a
247. Mike Corder, Genocide charge now possible for Sudan's al-Bashir, PUERTO
Rico DAILY SUN, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.prdailysun.coml?page=news.Article&id=
1265262476.
248. Id.
249. Jessberger & Geneuss, supra note 111, at 853; Osiel, supra note 114, at 1833 -
37.
250. Unrest in the Middle East and North Afica - Country By Country, supra
note 4.
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dozen countries. 251' Given this trend towards democracy, we will
hopefully soon see an increase in former heads of state who have
committed human rights violations being held accountable for their
actions.
As these events play out, it is critical that the relevant parties
think carefully about the legal and political consequences of deciding
where trials of heads of state should take place. These decisions most
likely will turn on a case-by-case determination of whether the
domestic governments are willing and able to try their former leader.
And, as the ICC begins to exercise jurisdiction over cases under its
principle of complementarily, international politics will also often, if
not always, intervene in the decision-making process of venue.
While dealing with these difficult issues, it is critical for
prosecutors and other relevant international policymakers to keep in
mind how choosing a venue can also decide the outcome of a trial.
Two fundamental decisions a prosecutor must make when bringing a
perpetrator to trial are deciding what to charge him with and deciding
how to prove he is liable. This note demonstrates how these two
basic elements can vary significantly among different types of courts.
Given the rapid developments of international criminal law within the
past two decades, the lay of the land will most likely end up evolving
to further complicate things. One can only speculate how the ICC
will apply the Rome Statute in trying cases. Additionally, the
possibility of new hybrid courts or future alternative mechanisms
cannot be ruled out.
However, as international courts and international criminal law
develops, the option of prosecuting heads of state in domestic courts
should not be ignored. Fujimori's trial may have paved the way as a
model for future domestic prosecutions in countries that have the
institutional and political capacity to fairly do so. The Supreme Court
of Peru conducted an efficient trial with an effective outcome that
even took measures to satisfy victims by providing reparations.
Given the unknown future of international criminal law, it is too early
to tell whether the trial of Fujimori illustrates that domestic courts
prove to be a better venue than international courts.
251. Id.
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